Abstract. In this paper we consider some mathematical aspects of electoral systems. Sometimes the results from elections seem paradoxical although they are mathematically correct. These cases are known as electoral paradoxes. A number of paradoxes of proportional and majoritarian electoral systems are considered.
INTRODUCTION
The electoral system in any state is a major factor for its political, economical and social development. The electoral system in a broad sense is the set of legal acts and accepted practices that govern the electoral process. In a narrow sense the electoral system is the means which transforms votes cast into seats, or mandates.
The existing more that 300 electoral systems all over the world may, in general, be divided into three large groups: majoritarian, proportional and mixed. A special case is the German electoral system which sometimes is wrongly defined as mixed. In fact, the German system is proportional with half of the seats being personified by a simple majoritarian system.
In this paper we consider a description of a proportional electoral system and a number of electoral paradoxes. The latter are mathematically correct and sometimes practically possible results of elections which contradict our intuition, see also [1, 2, 3] .
In what follows we denote by R and Q the sets of real and rational numbers, and by N = {1, 2, . . . }, N 0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . } and Q + -the sets of positive integer, nonnegative integer and nonnegative rational numbers, respectively. If X is a set then X n = X × X × · · · × X (n times).
For a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) ∈ R n we write a b when a k ≤ b k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n. The 1-norm of a is denoted as a = |a 1 We also use the following notations: n -the number of parties taking part in the elections and eligible to gain a seat; S -the total number of seats which are allocated to parties; C k -the name of the k-th party; v k -the number of votes cast for party C k ; v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) ∈ N n -the vector of votes; V = v 1 + v 2 + · · · + v n -the total number of valid votes; v * = v/V -the vector of relative vote distribution; s k ∈ N 0 -the number of seats allocated to party C k , where s 1 + s 2 + · · · + s n = S; s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) ∈ N n 0 -the vector of seats; s * = s/S -the vector of relative seat distribution; σ k = Sv k /V = Sv * k ∈ Q + -the proportional share of seats for party C k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n. We note that v = V , s = S and v * = s * = 1. A second interpretation of the above quantities is as follows. Let the country be divided into n regions C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n with population v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , respectively. Then s k is the number of seats preassigned to region C k and S is the total number of seats in the parliament.
PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS
In this section we give a mathematical description of a proportional system taking into account the possible effects of a barrier for parties eligible to take part in the distribution of seats.
Suppose that several parties receive votes in elections for a parliament. If there is a barrier of B > 1 votes then only parties with votes not less than B shall participate in the allocation of seats. In this statement of the problem it may happen that only one party shall pass the barrier taking all S seats. It is even possible that no party passes the barrier and there is no parliament elected! Fortunately, such cases are not known in the electoral practice. But a high barrier was a reason for only two parties to form a parliament. Suppose that at least two parties pass the barrier. Then excluding parties which do not pass the barrier as well as independent candidates, we come to the following statement of the problem of proportional seat allocation.
There are n ≥ 2 parties C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n participating in the distribution of a total of S ∈ N seats. The numbers of votes and seats for party C k are v k ∈ N and s k ∈ N 0 , respectively, where in case of a barrier of B votes it is fulfilled v k ≥ B.
0 be the vectors of party votes and party seats with V = v 1 + v 2 + · · · + v n being the total number of votes for parties eligible to gain a seat. We also have s 1 
Thus the initial data consists of the vector of votes v and the total number of seats S, while the output is the vector of seats s.
The proportional system, or the rule that transforms votes into seats, is described by the vector function (v, S) → s, denoted as
Here the number s k of seats allocated to party C k is given by
Thus the function f must satisfy the relation
For a proportional system it is natural to assume that v j > v k implies s j ≥ s k , see condition (4) below. In contrast, for a majoritarian system the case v j > v k and s j < s k is possible.
The function f may not be purely deterministic due to the restriction (2) and a stochastic element (a tie break) is necessary. Indeed, if n = 2, S = 1 and v 1 = v 2 then no deterministic rule may distribute one seat between two parties with equal votes. In this case one should use a stochastic mechanism to decide which party takes the seat.
The quantity v k /s k is the price of one seat of party C k . It shows approximately how many votes are necessary for one party seat. Since difficulties may occur when s k = 0, we may use another price, namely s k /v k , which shows how many seats are gained by one party vote. Usually s k /v k 1 although the case s k /v k > 1 is formally possible.
The function f from (1) should have some desirable properties connected with proportionality and monotonicity.
A general requirement for a proportional system is that party seats must be approximately proportional to party votes. This requirement may be expressed as
or V s Sv, or v * s * , where
For each function f and data v, S we may define the deviation from proportionality as
For a reasonably designed proportional system one should have
There are several families of proportional methods that obey the property (3) but for some of them the deviation from (3) may be quite impressive. However, we shall consider only methods obeying the monotonicity condition
which is a major characteristic of any purely proportional electoral system. Inequalities (4) mean that a party with more votes should not obtain less seats than a party with less votes. Another natural monotonicity condition which is assumed further on is that the function f k is not decreasing in v k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n, namely
A list of five natural looking (but not always achievable) properties of a proportional electoral system is given below.
The first property corresponds to the expectation that if more seats S + T (T ∈ N) are allocated instead of the initial S seats (with the same party votes) then a party may not decrease its seats.
P1 The function f satisfies the condition f
Property P1 means that if more seats are distributed with the same vote vector v then no party may loose a seat. The violation of this property is known as "Alabama paradox" since it had been observed when the American state Alabama should loose a seat if the number of seats in the American Congress would have been increased by 1.
If this paradox occurs then some parties loose a total of L ≥ 1 seats while the other parties win a total of L + T seats. We shall say that the Alabama paradox is of order N ∈ N if it occurs for T = N but does not occur for T = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. The classical Alabama paradox had been observed for T = 1 and is thus of first order.
The second property deals with the hypothesis that a new party takes part in the elections and gets seats with the old parties keeping their votes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n and S being the same. Then one may assume that an old party should not win aadditional seats. Let v ∈ N n and s ∈ N n 0 be the old distributions of votes and seats, and let a new party C n+1 with v n+1 ∈ N votes be added. Denote by s = ( 
and let s n+1 ≥ 1. That an old party should not win additional seats when a new party gets seats, may be formulated as follows.
P2 The inequalities s k
Property P2 means that when a new party is included (keeping S the same) then an old party may not increase its seats. The violation of Property P2 is called "New party paradox". If this paradox occurs then some of the old parties get additional L ≥ 1 seats, while the rest old parties loose L + s n+1 seats.
Property P2 may be formulated in a dual form which is more likely to happen. Suppose that after the elections Party C n is banned and looses its s n ≥ 1 seats. Suppose also that parties C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n−1 now receive all S seats (instead of S − s n seats before the ban) according to their votes
the new vector of seats with s 1 + s 2 + · · · + s n−1 = S. Then one may expect that no party shall loose a seat, i.e., that s k ≥ s k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. The violation of any of the last n − 1 inequalities may be called "Banned party paradox". In fact, it is a particular case of the Alabama paradox. Thus the New (or Banned) party paradox may be considered as a special case of the Alabama paradox.
The Banned party paradox may also occur when Party C n is not banned but has only M < s n names in its party list. Then there are s n − M additional seats to be distributed among the first n − 1 parties and the Alabama paradox may take place with T = s n − M.
The third property is concerned with the case when two electoral regions increase their population with certain increments. Then it is natural to assume that the region with a larger increment may not loose a seat. In terms of parliamentary elections the formulation of this property is as follows. Let two parties, say C 1 and C 2 , increase their votes from v 1 to v 1 + u 1 and from v 2 to v 2 + u 2 . Denote by s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) the vector of seats corresponding to the vote vector v = v + u, where u = (u 1 , u 2 , 0, 0, . . . , 0). Then the third property may be formulated in the following form.
Property P3 means that if the first party gets more additional votes in comparison with the second party (u 1 > u 2 ), then the first party should not loose a seat. The violation of this property is known as the "Population paradox". It had been observed in the American electoral practice with states instead of parties and population instead of votes.
Another property that seems natural is connected with the possibility to augment the votes and seats of two parties in order to form a coalition (or, dually, to split the votes and seats of a given party). Here it is natural to assume that the other parties shall keep their seats. In particular one may expect that the coalition shall obtain the sum of seats of its two parties. If this does not happen it may be considered as a paradox.
To describe this situation let n ≥ 3 and let the vector of votes (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) produces the vector of seats (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) . If parties C n−1 and C n form a coalition (adding up their votes) then we may consider a new vote
the vector of seats corresponding to v. Then the fourth property is formulated as follows.
P4
The equalities
are fulfilled.
In this case s n−1 = s n−1 + s n . The inverse may not be true: the last equality does not imply (6). Thus a weak form of Property P4 is simply the validity of the equality
The violation of property P4 is said to be a "Coalition paradox". In its dual form the Coalition paradox deals with the possibility to split the votes and seats of a given party as follows. Suppose that instead of the vote vector
. . , C n−1 keep their votes, while the v n votes of party C n are split in two parts u n and u n+1 . Let s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , s n+1 be the numbers of seats corresponding to the vote distribution v . Then one may expect that the conditions s k = s k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, are fulfilled. When they are violated we have a dual form of the Coalition paradox.
It is worth mentioning that while the Coalition paradox (violation of Property P4) may lead to a "strange" change of seats of any party by at most 1, The Alabama paradox (violation of P1 and P2) and the Population paradox (violation of P3) may occur in a more severe form with a party changing its seats with several units. In particular under the Population paradox a party may change its seats from very few to almost S/2! If we want to fulfill the proportionality property exactly then we obtain the fractional seats (or shares)
where q H := V /S is the so called Hare quota. Hence another desirable property may be formulated as follows.
P5 The inequalities
Property P5 is known as the Hare quota rule. The violation of Property P5 will be called "Hare quota paradox".
. . , n, in the formulation of Property P5.
Further on we consider two methods for proportional distribution of seats which satisfy condition (4).
The Largest Remainder Method with Hare quota, or LRM/H (known in Europe as Hare/Niemeyer method, and in USA as Hamilton method), does not have the Properties P1, P2, P3 and P4 but has Property P5. Moreover, LRM/H has been designed in order to satisfy P5.
In contrast, the Highest Averages Method, or HAM (known also as the D'Hondt method, has Properties P1 and P2 but does not have Properties P3, P4 and P5.
PARADOXES OF PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS
In the previous section we have considered five properties P1-P5 that a proportional electoral system should eventually have. Unfortunately, an election system cannot have all of them. We recall that conditions (4) and (5) will always be presupposed.
Any violation of Properties P1-P5 is referred to as a proportional system paradox. Of course, such a paradox is not a mathematical inconsistency. It rather means that the system behaves in a way which seams strange, or contradicts the intuition.
A relatively recent result of Balinski and Young (1982) shows that no system is free of paradoxes [1] . Using the above notations this result may be formulated as follows.
Theorem 2. (Balinski and Young, 1982) There is no a proportional electoral system that satisfies properties P1 (or, equivalently, P2) , P3 and P5.
Paradoxes due to other factors such as lack of an obligatory turnout and use of barriers are also possible in proportional electoral systems and are briefly discussed below.
Paradoxes Due to Small Turnout and Barriers
In most proportional systems the results are accepted as valid even if the voter turnout (number of votes cast divided to the number of all voters in the voting rolls) is small. If there are no restrictions on the turnout then the case V = 1 is theoretically possible (the conditions v k ≥ 1 (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) and n ≥ 2 assumed above imply V ≥ n ≥ 2; we ignore this fact for a moment). This means that
A single vote may elect the whole S-member parliament!
This, of course, has never happened in real parliamentary elections. But levels of 15-percent turnout have already been observed in elections for European Parliament. This is not a paradox in the above defined sense but may be politically dangerous.
In most proportional systems not every party is eligible to compete for a seat. Only parties passing the so called barrier may receive seats. The relative barrier β ∈ (0, 1) is usually measured in percents and is a part of all valid votes (4.00 or 5.56 percent in Bulgaria, 5.00 percent in Germany and Romania, 10.00 percent in Turkey). Some countries use the natural relative barrier β = 1/S.
The absolute barrier B = βV is the minimum number of votes that is necessary for a party to compete for a seat. If the number βV is not an integer then the barrier B is the next integer larger than βV , i.e., B = [βV ] + 1. Only parties C k with v k ≥ B take part in the distribution of seats. Until the end of this subsection we shall discuss the Bulgarian parliamentary elections with a relative barrier 0.04 and a total number of seats S = 240. Since 0.04 × 240 = 9.6 it is clear that a party C k either obtains no seats (if v k < B) or it obtains 9 or more seats (if v k ≥ B) . In fact, the least number of seats won in Bulgaria in five elections since 1991 had been 12.
In contrast to the previous section, here we do not exclude the case when one or more parties have votes below the barrier.
In what follows we shall say that "a single vote changes K ≥ 1 seats" if for v ∈ N n there is v ∈ N n such that v − v = 1 and s − s = K, where s is the vector of seats corresponding to v. Note that v = v is among the vectors which are nearest to v relative to the 1-norm.
We first note that although the average price of one seat is V /S 1, one vote may change one or more seats. This contradicts our intuition which expects that an average of V /(2S) votes should change a seat. A popular way to show this is as follows. Let the vector of votes v allocates s k ≥ 1 seats to party C k with v k votes. Reduce the votes of C k by 1 resulting in a vector of votes v which differs from v only in its k-th element v k = v k − 1. If C k still has s k seats, repeat the procedure. At a certain step party C k will loose at least one seat since otherwise it shall have seats with zero votes.
Less known is the following fact.
A single vote may change 9 or more seats.
Example 4. Suppose that party C 1 has v 1 = B votes. Then it has s 1 ≥ 9 seats (most probably s 1 ≥ 10). If we reduce v 1 by 1 then party C 1 will foll below the barrier and shall receive no seats.
But there is more to come. 
Paradoxes of HAM
The Highest Averages Method, or HAM, finds a seat distribution that maximizes the quantity min{v k /s k : k = 1, 2, . . . , n}. The algorithm realizing the HAM is as follows. More generally, a HAM type method is as follows. Let 0 < q 1 < q 2 < · · · < q S be an increasing sequence. Then we may define the quantities h i, j from h i, j = v j /q i . In particular, for q i = i we have the D'Hondt method, for q i = 2i − 1 -the Saint Laguë method and for q i = 2i -the Imperiali method.
It is easy to show that the following statement is valid.
Theorem 6. The HAM satisfies Properties P1, P2 and does not satisfy Properties P3, P4 and P5.
The HAM satisfies P1 and P2 as a direct corollary from the above definition. That HAM does not satisfy Properties P3, P4 and P5 may be shown by examples, see also Theorem 7 below.
The consequences of Theorem 6 may be dramatic as the next theorem suggests. To demonstrate this we shall compare the results produced by HAM and LRM/H under the conditions of the Bulgarian electoral system. The proof is based on a direct computation of seats for n = 11, v 1 = 15v 2 and
Of course, Property P5 may be violated in HAM not only for the largest party but for some other party. The HAM has been used in Bulgarian parliamentary elections in 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001 and 2005 . Here Property P5 has been violated three times: in 1994 and 1997 the first party got one seat more and in 2005 the second party took one seat more than Property P5 suggests.
In 2007 the seats for the Elections of members of the European Parliament from Bulgaria have been allocated by LRM/H. In this case HAM gives the same result.
Paradoxes of LRM/H
First we recall how LRM/H works for parties passing the barrier (if any).
1. The Hare quota q H = V /S is defined. To each party C k the proportional share (fractional number of seats)
and let R ∈ N be the sum of all remainders (we have R < n). Then the sum of automatic seats is S − R and there are R seats for further allocation. As mentioned above, LMR/H is designed so as to satisfy property P5. So possible paradoxes in using LMR/H are in violation of Properties P1 and P2 -the Alabama paradox, P3 -the Population paradox and P4 -the Coalition paradox. The counterpart of Theorem 6 here is as follows.
Theorem 8. The LMR/H satisfies Property P5 and does not satisfy Properties P1 -P4.
Examples of Paradoxes P1 and P3 are known from the electoral practice of USA in XIX century in the framework of the second interpretation described in the Introduction (C k are interpreted as states of USA). These examples are by no means minimal with regard to the number of parties (states), votes (population) and seats. Further examples with fewer parties are also known. Thus it is interesting to find examples of paradoxes with minimum number n of parties and with minimum total number S of seats (we recall that the inequality n ≥ 2 is assumed in order to avoid trivial results). What a "minimal example" means should become clear from the next result. The proof for the first order paradox consists in two steps. First we show that if n = 2 or S = 2 then an Alabama paradox of first order may not occur. Next we find an example of a first order Alabama paradox with n = S = 3 which completes the proof. Such examples are described below.
where r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1). If r 1 > r 2 and r 1 > 1 − r 1 − r 2 then s 1 = 1 and s 2 = s 3 = 0. If Parties C 2 and C 3 make a coalition we shall have the vote distribution v 1 = V r 1 , v 2 = V (1 − r 1 ). Hence if r 1 < 1 − r 1 the new seats will be s 1 = 0, s 2 = 1.
Hence we have proved the following result.
Theorem 12. The minimal Coalition paradox, where the coalition gets more seats than the sum of seats of its parties, is described by the vote distribution (11) under the conditions 1/3 < r 1 < 1/2, 1 − 2r 1 < r 2 < r 1 .
The HAM gives the same result for this case. Let now n = 3, S = 2 and
where r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1). If r 1 + r 2 > 1, r 1 < r 2 and r 1 < 2 − r 1 − r 2 then the seats will be s 1 = 0 and s 2 = s 3 = 1. When the second and third parties form a coalition we shall have
. When r 1 > 1/2 the numbers of seats will be s 1 = 1 and s 2 = 1. Hence the coalition gets one seat less than the sum of seats of its parties. As a result we have the following result.
Theorem 13. The minimal Coalition paradox, where the coalition gets less seats than the sum of seats of its parties, is described by the vote distribution (12) under the conditions 1/2 < r 1 < 2/3, r 1 < r 2 < 2(1 − r 1 ).
PARADOXES OF MAJORITARIAN SYSTEMS
Paradoxes of majoritarian systems are well known. Moreover, unlike paradoxes of proportional systems which rarely happen, paradoxes of majoritarian systems have been observed many times in history. These paradoxes are one of the reasons which forced many democracies to abandon majoritarian systems and to start using more proportional electoral systems. This process may be observed even in the United Kingdom -the birthplace of the classical majoritarian system. Consider a standard majoritarian system with relative or absolute majority (in one or two rounds, respectively). Then there are S > 1 one-seat electoral regions, or constituencies, and the candidate with the majority of votes in each region is considered elected.
A serious drawback of majoritarian systems is that due to geographical reasons or even to political manipulations the population in different constituencies may vary significantly. These differences may reach up to four times as in England. However, we shall not deal with such irregularities assuming that in all constituencies the number of votes cast is the same. We suppose also that this number is odd and denote it by 2q + 1, q ∈ N 0 . Even under the above assumption there are still several paradoxes of majoritarian systems. We discuss two such paradoxes denoting them by M1 and M2.
For simplicity we assume that only two parties C 1 and C 2 take part in the elections. We recall that v k and s k are the numbers of votes and seats for party C k , respectively.
In this case the first party receives one vote more than the second party in each of the S constituencies.
An extreme form of this paradox is that Party C 1 with only v 1 = S votes takes all S seats. Here party C 1 gets one vote in each constituency while Party C 2 receives non. Another formulation of this paradox is the next statement.
Party C Large deviations from proportionality are well known in countries using majoritarian systems. For example in France a party with 40% of the votes may win about 80% of the seats. In Great Britain and New Zealand a party with more than half of the votes takes less than half of the seats, etc.
